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ARGUMENT
L

THE DISMISSAL OF OKELBERRY'S CLAIMS REGARDING STOCK
OWNERSHIP WAS INAPPROPRIATE GIVEN THE PROCEDURAL
POSTURE OF THIS CASE
West Daniels first asserts that "a plain reading of . . . the Articles . . . confirms

that there are no preconditions" for the ownership of West Daniels stock. In so
arguing, West Daniels misstates the standard by which this analysis should have been
conducted. Judge Schofield's ruling did not come by way of trial or even by way of
summary judgment. Rather, Judge Schofield's ruling was in response to a rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted. See R.
at 349. "[W]hen determining whether a trial court properly dismissed an action under
rule 12(b)(6), we assume that the factual allegations in the complaint are true and we
draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Sony
Electronics, Inc. v. Reben 2004 UT App 420, 110, 103 P.3d 186 (quotations and
citations omitted). In such circumstances, "the complaint is liberally construed," and
the court "is called upon to make a sympathetic perusal of the complaint." 61A
Am.Jur.2d Pleading § 585 (2004) (emphasis added) (quotations and citations omitted).
Such motions "are looked on with disfavor by the courts, and are granted sparingly
and with care. The main reason for this disfavor is the basic precept that the primary
objective of the law is to obtain a determination on the merits of the claim, and that
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accordingly, a case should be tried on the proofs rather than on the pleadings,

biA

Am Jur.2d Pleadings §582 (2004).
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procedural posture alone, Judge Schofield's determination that there were no
preconditions to ownership of West Daniels stock was simply incorrect.
II.

T H E R E IS N O "UNAMBIGUOLJS PROVISION" IN T H E ARTICLES O F
I N C O R P O R A T I O N T H A T PROHIBITS T H E ESTABLISHMENT O F
P R E C O N D I T I O N S F O R STOCK OWNERSHIP
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Incorporation this "unambiguous provision" can be found. Judge Schofield did not
specifically identify such a provision in either of his rulings, and West Daniels has not
identified where this provision is found in any of its pleadings before this Court.
A careful examination of the Articles, however, shows that there simply is no
such provision. Instead, Judge Schofield appears to have concluded that, because the
Articles do not say that there are preconditions to ownership of West Daniels stock
(such as concurrent ownership of Forest Service permits), any language in the Bylaws
imposing such a requirement is therefore unauthorized. This argument is not well
founded. Though it is unquestionably true that provisions in a corporation's bylaws
cannot conflict with any provisions in the articles of incorporation, it still does not
follow that a provision in the bylaws is invalid if it goes beyond the scope of what is
covered in the articles of incorporation themselves. In other words, if silence
regarding a particular issue in the articles of incorporation is to be interpreted as
barring all future regulation of that issue in the bylaws, then what would be the point
of allowing bylaws at all? Rather than endorsing such a strained rule, this Court
should instead note the obvious-that while a provision in the bylaws is invalid if it is
contradicted by affirmative language in the articles of incorporation, a provision in the
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bylaws is not invalidated simply because it fills the gaps left by the articles of
incorporation's silence.1
III.

THE ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION AND THE ACCEPTED
CORPORATE PURPOSE BOTH INDICATE THAT THERE ARE
PRECONDITIONS FOR STOCK OWNERSHIP IN WEST DANIELS.
Judge Schofield's ruling in the present case is not only incorrect because of the

Articles of Incorporation's failure to prohibit any preconditions for stock ownership,
but also because the Articles of Incorporation actually provide the basis for the two
preconditions for ownership that are at issue in this case.

*In his January 2000 ruling (attached to West Daniels' reply brief as Attachment
F), Judge Schofield did point out that there is a clear inconsistency between the vote
allocation set forth in the Articles (which allows members one vote per share of stock)
and the vote allocation set forth in the Bylaws (which allows members one vote per head
of cattle). See kL at 113,8. To the extent that these provisions are in direct conflict, the
vote allocations set forth in the Articles certainly control and the contrary provisions in
the Bylaws would be invalid. The existence of this one particular conflict, however,
should not be interpreted to mean that all other provisions in the Bylaws are also invalid.
Otherwise, West Daniels would be left without any authoritative corporate document
that would govern such necessary functions as the qualifications for Board membership
(addressed in Bylaws, Article IV), the duties of the various officers (addressed in Bylaws,
Articles VI and VII), the Board's powers to assess dues and assessment fees (addressed in
the Bylaws, Article IX), and the rules for assembling a quorum and for corporate voting
(Bylaws, Article XIII). Further, after hearing the evidence at the trial that was ultimately
held on the other issues, Judge Eyre specifically found that "the Bylaws of the defendant
Association received as Exhibit 2 have never been rescinded or amended."
See West
Daniels' Reply Brief, Exhibit C, 119. West Daniels has not challenged this finding; as
such, under the law of this case, the remaining provisions in the Bylaws are still
controlling and valid.
Regardless, Judge Schofield's ruling and West Daniels' argument are explicitly
based on the contention that there is a specific, unambiguous provision in the Articles
that invalidates any precondition to stock ownership. Because this phantom provision
has never been specifically identified, it simply cannot be relied upon here.
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First, as was discussed more fully in the opening brief, the Articles of
Incorporation state that "two shares shall be issued for each head of livestock." West
Daniels now argues that this provision was only meant to apply to the initial
distribution of stock after the formation of the Association. Using proper tools of
contractual interpretation, however, this Court can and should hold that the provision
is at the very least ambiguous, and that Okelberry was entitled to a trial as to whether
this provision set forth preconditions for subsequent stock ownership in West Daniels.
In considering the meaning of this provision, it is important to note that
corporate charters and articles of incorporation are analyzed using the same rules of
construction that apply to cases involving ordinary contracts. See Turner v. HiCountry Homeowners Ass'n. 910 P.2d 1223, 1225 (Utah 1996); see also 18A
Am.Jur.2d Corporations § 171 (stating that "the courts employ general principles of
contract interpretation when construing articles of incorporation or a certificate of
incorporation"); Bd. of Dirs. v. Bd. of Trs.. 798 A.2d 1068, 1079 n.12 (D.C.2002); State
v. Delano Cmty. Dev. Corp.. 571 N.W.2d 233, 236 (Minn. 1997). Under standard
rules of contractual interpretation, a question regarding the meaning of a particular
contractual provision hinges on the parties' intent. "The underlying purpose in
construing or interpreting a contract is to ascertain the intentions of the parties to the
contract. In interpreting a contract, the intentions of the parties are controlling."
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WebBank v. American Gen. Annuity Serv. Corp.. 2002 UT 88, 117, 54 P.3d 1139
(quotations and citations omitted).
If the court determines that the plain language of the contract is unambiguous,
then the question of intent is deemed to be a question of law, and the court is
empowered to issue a ruling as to the parties' contractual intent in a pre-trial motion.
See Novell Inc. v. The Canopy Group. Inc.. 2004 UT App 162, f20, 92 P.3d 768. On
the other hand, the interpretation of an ambiguous provision presents a question of
fact that should be resolved only at trial-and not in a pre-trial motion for dismissal or
summary judgment. See WebBank. 2002 UT 88 at 122 ("When ambiguity exists, the
intent of the parties becomes a question of fact. A motion for summary judgment may
not be granted if . . . there is a factual issue as to what the parties intended."); Canyon
Meadows Home Owners Ass'n v. Wasatch County. 2001 UT App 414, 125, 40 P.3d
1148 (stating that where contractual language is deemed "ambiguous . . . then
determining the meaning of . . . the clause would not be suitable for summary
judgment and instead should be an issue for trial."); 17A Am.Jur.2d Contracts § 332
(2004) ?

2

Notably, several courts have specifically held that this transformation from a
question of law to a question of fact occurs even in cases where a corporate charter is at
issue. See, e.g.. Bd. of Dirs. 798 A.2d at 1079 n.12; Ferrill v. North American Hunting
Retriever Ass'n. Inc.. 795 A.2d 1208, 1211-12 (Vt. 2002).
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Under Utah law, a provision is deemed to be ambiguous if the provision is
"capable of more than one reasonable interpretation because of uncertain meanings of
terms, missing terms, or other facial deficiencies." WebBank, 2002 UT 88 at i[20. If
both parties "present[] contrary but plausible interpretations of the language at issue,"
then the provision is deemed to be ambiguous. Canyon Meadows Home Owners
Assji, 2001 UT App 414 at if21. As discussed above, neither Judge Schofield nor West
Daniels have pointed to any particular provision from the Articles of Incorporation
that specifically disallows the establishment of preconditions for stock ownership.
Instead, West Daniels now simply argues that the Articles of Incorporation's insistence
that "two shares shall be issued for each head of livestock" was limited in effect to the
"method of initial stock distribution" (emphasis added).
Contrary to West Daniels' suggestion, however, the word "initial" doesn't
appear in the provision itself, and there is nothing else in that provision that expressly
indicates that the two share/head rule was to limited to that initial offering. As such, a
trier of fact could reasonably conclude that the Article's statement that "two shares
shall be issued for each head of livestock" was also intended to regulate the amount of
stock that would be issued whenever new members joined the Association, and that it
was also intended to govern the distribution and reallocation of stock whenever
current members received permission to graze additional cattle on Association land.
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Indeed, prior to having this issue dismissed by Judge Schofield, Okelberry was
prepared to present evidence indicating that ownership of shares of stock in the
Association has until recently been limited to members who were grazing livestock.
Under the terms of Upland Industries Corporation v. Pacific Gamble Robinson Co.,
684 P.2d 638 (Utah 1984), the Association's longstanding pattern of conduct would
have been highly significant in determining the precise meaning behind the challenged
provision. See kL at 642 (holding that the "construction given to [a contractual
provision] by the acts and conduct of the parties with knowledge of its terms, before
any controversy has arisen as to its meaning, is entitled to great weight, and will, when
reasonable, be adopted and enforced by the court5'); see also Younger v. Wisdom
Society. 175 Cal.Rptr. 542, 547 (Cal.Ct. App. 2d Dist. Div. 4 1981) (stating that, when
interpreting a corporation's articles of incorporation, "the court could consider the
corporation's actual conduct and method of operation"); Bd. of Directors, 798 A.2d at
1080 (same); Acadian Geophysical Servs., Inc. v. Cameron, 119 S.W.3d 290, 302 (Tex.
App 2003) (same); Shafer v. Bd. of Trustees of Sandy Hook Yacht Club Estates, Inc.,
883 P.2d 1387, 1393 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (same); 18A Am.Jur. 2d Corporations § 170
(stating that, "the court may take into consideration the actual conduct of the
corporation and its method of operation" when interpreting a provision in the articles
of incorporation). Because of Judge Schofield's premature dismissal, however, this
evidence has not yet been presented to the court.
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The prospective nature of the two share/head provision is further plausible
when considered alongside the overriding purpose of this particular corporation. See
18A Am.Jur.2d Corporations § 175 (2004) ("It has been said that the purposes clause is
the real measure of a corporation's authority, and it predominates over a powers
clause, which only describes the general powers granted by the law to all corporations
of a particular kind, plus those granted by the approval of its specific charter."). As
discussed more fully in the opening brief, West Daniels was formed by a group of
cattlemen and ranchers who wanted to pool their resources in order to collectively
purchase and manage grazing lands for their own individual herds. As was also
discussed, the forage-supply on the West Daniels land is limited, thereby also
restricting the number of cattle that could graze on the land during any given season.
It is in large part because of these natural limitations that there was such a
pronounced link between the number of cattle that a member was grazing and the
amount of stock that the member was allowed to own in the Association itself. As
indicated in the Complaint, the Association has traditionally run 695 head of cattle on
its property. Under these conditions, a member who was being permitted to graze 347
cattle on the Association's property would, in a very literal way, have a 50% interest in
the management decisions of the West Daniels Association. If that same member
reduced his or her herd to 150 cattle in a subsequent year, however, it would make
sense to then require the member to relinquish those shares, insofar as that member no
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longer had the same degree of interest in the Association's grazing activities.3 In this
manner, tying the amount of stock that a member could own to the amount of cattle
that the member was currently grazing was a logical way of keeping control of the
corporation in the hands of those who actually had a personal interest in making wise
and proper grazing decisions. It was also a way of preventing the Association from
being overtaken by non-grazing investors- who would by definition be inclined to
manage the land with an eye towards profit-maximization, rather than grazingregulation.
It is also for this reason that the Forest Service permits were so uniformly
considered to be part and parcel of the shares of stock in West Daniels. Though it is
certainly true, as West Daniels has suggested, that members could have chosen to graze

3

West Daniels contends that this would lead to the "absurd" result of requiring
shareholders to relinquish shares in the event of "drought or disease." This assertion is
incorrect. If a 100-head member lost 50 head due to drought or disease, that member
would presumably be replacing those 50 head in the subsequent season. As such, the
member's interest in the corporation would stay the same, and he or she would properly
retain his or her stock. Such a scenario would be no different than that which would face
the Association if a particular member had a certain number of his or her herd sold and
slaughtered. Presumably, that member would then be replacing those cattle with new
head during the coming season. The point here is that the grazing permits and the
associated voting rights don't attach to a particular cow, but rather to the member's own
continued intent to graze that same number of cattle on Association lands.
There is a stark difference between these situations, however, and one in which
the 100-head member instead simply chooses to reduce his or her herd for business or
personal reasons. In this scenario, the member's interest in the Association as a grazingoriented body is clearly no longer the same, and it is for this reason that the Articles of
Incorporation implicitly allow for the reduction of that individual's stock ownership.
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their cattle on a different range during the summer season, the reality is that this
simply was not occurring. As indicated in footnote 12 of Okelberry's opening brief,
one of West Daniels5 own witnesses stated at trial that he couldn't think of one
instance prior to 1990 in which the Forest Service permits were not transferred
alongside the shares of stock in West Daniels. As discussed above, this decades-long
pattern of conduct is highly significant in terms of interpreting the provisions of the
Articles of Incorporation and the Bylaws, and Okelberry should have been allowed to
have developed it and presented it at trial.
In this manner, West Daniels' protestations that Okelberry is attempting to
"gain a windfall increase in his ownership share . . . by inventing ownership
requirements out of thin air" could not be further from the truth. It is not Okelberry
who is attempting to "gain a windfall increase" here. Rather, it is the shareholders in
West Daniels who no longer own their Forest Service permits, who are no longer
grazing cattle on West Daniels land, and yet who are still claiming the right to exercise
control over what is by charter supposed to be a non-profit grazing cooperative. As
evidenced by their decisions to lease out the land to a non-shareholder and then
explore the possibilities for selling that land, those members now have nothing more
than a financial interest in this land as a piece of property, with this interest running
directly contrary the Articles of Incorporation's insistence that it be reserved for the
grazing of the members' cattle.
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Thus, rather than constructing the membership requirements "out of thin air,"
Okelberry is simply asking that the stock allocation system that was set forth in the
Articles of Incorporation continue to be adhered to. At the very least, Ray Okelberry
simply wants the opportunity to present his evidence regarding the meaning of the
Articles of Incorporation and Bylaws to a trier of fact.
In short, this is a complicated corporate problem that can only properly be
resolved through a careful examination of the evidence regarding the intent of the
corporate framers-as well as through a detailed look at the meaning of the
corporation's charter, as evidenced by the subsequent decades of conduct by the
Association members. Judge Schofield improperly resolved this dispute without
allowing Okelberry to develop and present that evidence. This decision was in error.

DATED this J _ day of March, 2005.

D O N R. PETERSEN and
RYAN D. TENNEY, for:
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
Attorneys for Appellee
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